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Abstract. We find evidence that initial public offering (IPO) firms, on average, have high positive issue-year
earnings and abnormal accruals, followed by poor long-run earnings and negative abnormal accruals. The IPO-
year abnormal, and not expected, accruals explain the cross-sectional variation in post-issue earnings and stock
returns. The results are robust with respect to alternative abnormal accruals and earnings performance measures.
IPO firms adopt more income-increasing depreciation policies when they deviate from similar prior performance
same industry non-issuers, and they provide significantly less for uncollectible accounts receivable than their
matched non-issuers. The results taken together suggest opportunistic earnings management partially explains the
new issues anomaly.
Accrual accounting provides managers with discretion in the reporting of earnings. This
allows financial reports to reflect managerial information about underlying economic con-
ditions more accurately than is possible with a strictly mechanical reporting rule. However,
if in some circumstances managers wish to mislead investors, discretion provides greater
scope for obscuring true underlying firm performance. The incentives to manage earnings
may be especially strong when the firm is planning to sell shares to the market, as in an
initial public offering (IPO).
IPOs are a major corporate event as evidenced by the size of the IPO market. Between
1980 and 1990, a total of 8,199 IPOs raised gross proceeds of $276,076m (unadjusted for real
purchasing power), and in 1997 alone, 1,376 IPOs for $121,387m were issued. Furthermore,
IPOs play an economic role in facilitating economic innovation that is disproportionate
relative to their dollar volume. The empirical question of whether firms manage earnings
in IPOs is therefore important both in itself and because of its bearing on capital markets
in general.
Several aspects of IPOs provide incentives to firms to manage earnings opportunistically
by reporting high IPO accruals. High reported earnings raise stock prices, and a high stock
price is desirable when a firm is selling equity. There are generally high uncertainties
about the newly public firm, high information asymmetries between the issuer and the
investors, and few reliable independent sources of information about the firm. Thus, it may
be difficult for investors to judge the appropriateness of IPO-firm accruals as indicators of
future performance.
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If firms seek to boost earnings before selling stock, initial financial statements of the
newly public firm will contain unusually high positive accruals. These accruals will not
reflect favorable long-run prospects as strongly as accruals of an ordinary non-IPO firm. In
this scenario, high earnings cannot be sustained, so earnings in the post-IPO years decline.
To test for opportunism, in this paper we examine the levels of IPO-year and post-IPO
earnings and accruals, and the relation between IPO-year accruals (in excess of a normal
benchmark) to the firms’ long-term earnings in the years after the IPO. A finding that
accruals are unusually high in the IPO year, that post-IPO earnings are low, and that high
IPO-year accruals predict low subsequent earnings would be consistent with the hypothesis
of opportunism.
Prior research on earnings behavior in IPOs has focused on whether accruals prior to
the public issue are unusually high. Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993) and Friedlan (1994)
reach opposite conclusions. The former study finds no evidence for high abnormal pre-IPO
accruals whereas the latter does.
Our study differs from these studies in several significant ways: (1) We examine both
issue-year and long-run post-issue accruals and earnings performance.1 (2) We examine the
cross-sectional relation of issue-year excess accruals to post-issue earnings. (3) The issue-
year accruals we examine include both pre and post-IPO accruals.2 Thi has the advantage
of permitting considerably larger and more comprehensive sample (1,682 IPOs from 1980–
1990 versus 100 to 200 in past studies). (4) We consider several alternative benchmarks
for abnormal accruals. Since different methods are subject to different kinds of errors and
biases, it is valuable to see how robust the findings are with respect to alternative measures
of abnormal accruals. (5) We examine three alternative measures for post-issue earnings
performance—the IPO firm’s own return on sales, the industry-adjusted return on sales,
and a matched-firm relative return on sales where the match is selected based on similar
return on sales as the IPO-issue year. (6) We analyze individual accrual-related items such
as depreciation and the provision for accounts receivable losses to understand better the
mechanisms by which management may improve issue-year earnings.
Regarding (4) above, no model can perfectly identify the benchmark level of accruals
expected as a response to the firm’s economic conditions. Such a benchmark is needed to
measure the discretionary component of accruals that is due to special incentives to manage
earnings. There is much debate as to the success of the alternative proxies. As a check on
the robustness of the results, we use three alternative benchmarks; two are based on our
extensions of the Jones (1991) model for expected accruals and the third is derived from
the Beneish (1994) model for the likelihood that the firm is an earnings manipulator. The
general conclusions of our paper are robust with respect to these measures, and also to a
variety of alternative test specifications.
We find that on average the IPO-year reported earnings performance and abnormal ac-
cruals are unusually high. However, the post-IPO earnings performance is significantly
below the industry average or similar prior-performing non-issuing industry peers. Cross-
sectionally, high IPO-year abnormal current accruals predict low future earnings perfor-
mance. The return on sales of IPO firms classified to be in the “aggressive” quartile (the
highest issue-year abnormal current accruals) underperform the most in the three years after
the IPO fiscal year. The return on sales in the three post-IPO years relative to the IPO year
ARE ACCRUALS OPPORTUNISTIC? 177
decline by a mean 16.50% and median 8.28% for the aggressive quartile. In contrast, the
IPO firms in the “conservative” quartile (the lowest issue-year abnormal current accruals) do
not underperform in the post-issue years. Importantly, the post-issue earnings performance
is not predictable using either expected current accruals, abnormal long-term accruals, or
expected long-term accruals.
In the analyses of individual accounting items, we find that IPO firms adopt more income-
increasing depreciation policies when they deviate from similarly performing non-issuing
industry peers, and provide significantly less for uncollectible accounts receivables than
their matched non-issuers.
In addition to these findings regarding earnings performance, we also examine the relation
of accruals to long-term stock returns performance. Recent literature on the new issues
puzzle documents that investors misvalue IPO firms and do not adequately discount the
high issue-year accruals of IPO firms. For example, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter
(1995) find that the post-issue stock returns of IPO firms underperform their same size
non-issuing industry peers for as long as three to five years after the offering. Teoh, Welch,
and Wong (1998a) find that the extent of the post-IPO stock return underperformance is
predicted by abnormal current accruals.
If investors do not adequately discount the strategic use of IPO-year accruals, they will
be overly optimistic about the future earnings potential of the IPO firms. Consequently, in
future years, as earnings are realized below earlier expectations, investors will revalue the
firm downwards. We confirm in our sample the results of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a)
that the IPO-year abnormal accruals, and not expected accruals, predict greater post-issue
stock return underperformance. We also show that this negative relation obtains under
an alternative earnings management measure, the IPO-year Beneish M-score. Taken as a
whole, the evidence suggests that investor overoptimism about IPOs comes from the failure
to discount fully for earnings which have been inflated opportunistically by accruals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly describes the IPO pro-
cess to suggest how incentives and opportunities for earnings management might arise and
what the constraints on earnings management might be. Section 2 describes the sample
selection procedure and estimation methods for the three earnings management proxies.
Section 3 presents evidence on post-issue earnings underperformance and the relation of
the time series earnings profile to the time series profiles of abnormal and expected accruals.
The ability of the earnings management proxies to predict long-term post-issue net income
performance is explored in Section 4. Post-issue stock returns’ predictability by IPO ac-
cruals measures is examined in Section 5. Section 6 offers supplementary tests to locate
the mechanism for accruals management, primarily in two accounting items, depreciation
and allowance for accounts receivable losses. Section 7 concludes the paper.
1. The IPO Process
The IPO process typically begins with discussions between an entrepreneur and an un-
derwriter about the desirability of taking the firm public. The underwriter, in conjunction
with the issuing firm, prepares an offering prospectus. This document contains externally
audited financial statements for up to the most recent three years, and information about the
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firm, its business, future prospects, competitors and products. It also includes other relevant
financial information such as ownership structure. The prospectus is used as a marketing
document by the underwriter in road shows to solicit demand, usually from institutional
investors.
There are some noteworthy features of the IPO process that offer opportunities and incen-
tives to manage earnings. First, there is relatively little information available to investors
from public sources about private firms so investors have to rely primarily on the financial
statements reported in the prospectus. Rao (1993) reports that there is almost no news
media coverage of firms in the years before going public. With few other sources of in-
formation to corroborate the financial statements, it is hard for investors to judge whether
the accruals reflect the fundamental values of the firm appropriately. Second, underwriters
commonly use the price-earnings multiple of a publicly-traded firm in the same industry as
the prospective IPO to set the offer price.3 Thus, the issuer and the underwriter may have
an incentive to report favorable accounting information in the prospectus to increase the
chance of having the issue fully subscribed. These incentives are further encouraged by
current accounting regulation (Accounting Principles Board (APB) 20) allowing a company
undertaking an IPO to change any and all accounting principles via retroactive restatement
of the financial statements presented in the offering prospectus. The accounting rule gives
an exceptional opportunity for the issuer to doctor the profile of accounting earnings in the
pre-issue fiscal years.
Limits on the incentives for opportunistic earnings management do exist. One regulatory
limit on discretion is the requirement that accounting reports presented in the offering
prospectus be audited by an external accounting firm to verify compliance with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Furthermore, investment bankers, auditors, and
entrepreneurs are subject to lawsuits for misrepresentation of accounting reports, and an
investment banker’s reputation affects subsequent market share.
However, the constraints upon opportunistic earnings management are imperfect. GAAP
accrual accounting system permits discretion in recognizing the timing and amounts of
revenues and expenses. Sufficient flexibility may be permitted within GAAP to allow
for substantial earnings management. Based on discussions with investment bankers, it
appears that the underwriters’ due diligence process generally does not include auditing
the firm’s financial statements. The underwriters, in general, rely on the auditor’s opinion
regarding the accuracy of the reported accounting numbers. Auditors, in turn, generally
defer to management’s judgement on discretionary accrual items that do not explicitly
violate GAAP.
We focus on accruals in the first fiscal year when the firm is public, which includes some
pre-issue months, and we do not analyze accruals in the pre-issue fiscal year.4 The key
advantage is that we are able to obtain a large sample of IPOs with readily available data
on Compustat. In addition, IPO firms have many incentives to continue to boost earnings
in the period immediatelyafter the IPO, as described below.
The expectation of a high after-market price increases the likelihood that the offering will
be fully subscribed, and hence increases the likelihood that the underwriter will be willing to
accept the offer price. The underwriter guarantees the issue proceeds in a firm commitment
offering, and stands to lose if the issue is undersubscribed because the offer price is set
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too high. In addition, the investment banker practices what is commonly referred to as
“price stabilization,” which is permitted under Rule 10b-7 by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The investment banker steps in to buy the stock of the firm to prop up
the offer price in the aftermarket.5 Thus, the firm may be under pressure from the investment
banker to continue to manipulate earnings after the IPO to help support the stock price.
Commonly, there is a lock-up period of about 180 days or longer after the issue date
during which the original IPO entrepreneurs commit not to sell their shares. Thus, the
entrepreneurs have an incentive to maintain high earnings until after the lock-up period.
The high post-IPO earnings help maintain a high market price for the secondary offerings
by the entrepreneurs.6
A further incentive to maintain high earnings after the issue concerns the verbal earnings
projections that are commonly hinted at to investors during road shows when the marketing
of the new issue begins.7 After trading begins, the security analysts initiating coverage of the
firm will generally disseminate the earnings projections widely. To support the initial offer
price, analysts at the underwriting investment banking firms are under pressure to make
the most favorable earnings projections possible. In turn, the issuing firm is under pressure
to meet those projections in the aftermarket to safeguard its reputation for reliability, to
maintain the goodwill of investors, investment bankers, and analysts who made the initial
earnings projections, and to avoid lawsuits by disgruntled shareholders.8
Finally, it is common for IPO firms to provide stock rights and stock options to encour-
age management to remain after the firm goes public. These management compensation
instruments carry restrictions on when the stock can be sold and when the options can be
exercised, which is usually not for several months or years after the IPO date. Thus, man-
agers compensated through these plans have an additional incentive to manage earnings in
order to maintain stock prices until the restrictions on selling expire.
2. Sample Selection and Data
Our sample consists of 1,682 IPO firms going public between 1980 and 1990.9 For inclusion
in the sample, IPOs must satisfy the following criteria: (1) offer price> $1, (2) gross
proceeds> $1m, (3) only common stock offerings, and (4) an investment banker handled
the offering. The actual sample size varies in different tests according to financial data
availability on Compustat (full coverage and research files are included).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. The sample covers a wide range of
industries; a total of 63 two-digit SIC codes are represented. IPO firms are concentrated
in the computer and high-technology industries (SIC codes 35, 36, 38, and 73), making
up 41.7% of the total sample. There is also some clustering in time; relatively heavy
volume years are in 1983, 1986, and 1987. The general offering and firm characteristics
are comparable to Ritter’s (1991) sample of IPOs. IPO firms are generally small in size,
underpriced, newly incorporated, have high sales revenue and growth, and earn negative
excess returns in the first three years after issue.
180 TEOH, WONG AND RAO
Table 1.Characteristics of sample of firms conducting initial public offerings during fiscal years 1980 to 1990.
Panel A: Offering and Firm Characteristics
TA MV SALES CS AGE OP UNDERP CAR3
$m $m $m % Years $ % %
Mean 186.51 105.74 105.72 29.01 9.21 10.32 6.94 −30.18
Median •20.97 •29.65 •21.10 22.04 5.00 •9.00 1.30 −64.09
Panel B: Time Distribution of Sample
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative
Frequency Percent
80 •53 •3.2 ••53 ••3.2
81 149 •8.9 •202 •12.0
82 •63 •3.7 •265 •15.8
83 258 15.3 •523 •31.1
84 144 •8.6 •667 •39.7
85 136 •8.1 •803 •47.7
86 349 20.7 1152 •68.5
87 302 18.0 1454 •86.4
88 117 •7.0 1571 •93.4
89 •96 •5.7 1667 •99.1
90 •15 •0.9 1682 100.0
Panel C: Industry Distribution of IPO Sample
Industry Name SIC codes Frequency Percent
Oil and Gas 13 ••43 ••2.6
Food Products 20 ••29 ••1.7
Chemical products 28 ••94 ••5.6
Electronic Equipment 36 •161 ••9.6
Scientific Instruments 38 •141 ••8.4
Communications 48 ••49 ••2.9
Durable Goods 50 ••61 ••3.6
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 ••45 ••2.7
Health 80 ••57 ••3.4
Paper & Paper Products 24–27 ••50 ••3.0
Manufacturing 30–34 ••72 ••4.3
Transportation 37, 39, 40–42, 44, 45 ••91 ••5.4
Retail 53, 54, 56, 57, 59 •112 ••6.7
Financial Service 61, 62, 64, 65 ••49 ••2.9
Entertainment Services 70, 78, 79 ••37 ••2.2
Computer Equipment & Services 35, 73 •399 •23.7
All Others a •192 •11.4
Total 1682 100.0
a SIC codes 1, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 29, 47, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63, 67, 72, 75, 76, 82, 83, 87, and 99. Total
assets (TA), market value (MV) of equity, and sales are measured at the end of the fiscal year of issue. Sales growth
(CS) measures the change in sales between the first fiscal year and the year prior to issue scaled by beginning
total assets. Age is the number of years between incorporation and IPO date. OP is offer price and UNDERP is
initial return of the IPO stock. 3-year cumulative abnormal return (CAR3) is a 3-year continuously compounded
IPO stock return starting 3 months after the fiscal year end of issue minus the corresponding compounded market
return.
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2.1. Proxies for Earnings Management
Recent studies on earnings management have relied primarily on accruals-based measures
to estimate the degree of manipulation.10 We report results based on three proxies for
earnings management, and further robustness checks are also performed using alternative
measures. Two of the proxies are obtained from accruals measured relative to some expected
benchmarks based on firm and industry characteristics. The third proxy uses a score for
the likelihood that the firm is a manipulator from a model using firm financial ratios as
indicators.
As a summary measure reflecting the firm’s accounting choices, accruals are likely to
capture evidence of earnings manipulation. However, as Kaplan (1985) points out, accruals
likely also vary with the firm’s economic conditions. Thus, a model is needed to extract
from total accruals the normal (orexpected) accruals components which are dictated by
exogenous economic conditions. We term the remaining accruals componentabnormal
accruals, which we use as a proxy for the amount of earnings management. In addition,
we distinguish between current and long-term accruals to capture differential susceptibility
to manipulation between these items; see Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986), and Guenther
(1994).
Total accruals are measured as net income (172) minus cash flows from operations (308);
Compustat items in parentheses.11 Current accruals are measured as the change in the
following non-cash working capital items:1[accounts receivables (2)+ inventory (3)+
other current assets (68)]−1[accounts payable (70)+ taxes payable (71)+ other current
liabilities (72)]. Long-term accruals are total accruals minus current accruals.
2.1.1. Cross-Sectional Term-Adjusted Jones Accruals
We use the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model first to separate total accruals into
expected and abnormal components.12 In some parts of the paper, we distinguish accruals by
their terms (i.e., current and long-term). In these cases, we measure expected and abnormal
current and long-term accruals using a term-adjustment extension to the Jones model as
described below. Following Jones, all accrual variables are scaled by lagged total assets.
The Jones model assumes that two firm characteristics, gross property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPE) and the change in revenues (1Sales), largely determine the amount of accruals a
firm reports in response to firm economic conditions. Therefore, total accruals are regressed
on PPE and1 Sales to estimate expected and abnormal accruals. Gross PPE adjusts for
expected depreciation expense, and the change in revenues adjusts for expected changes in
working capital accounts. To the extent that PPE and1 Sales adequately reflect changes in
firm economic conditions before managerial manipulation, the estimated expected accruals
will reflect accrual responses to changes in the firm’s economic conditions. However, sales
revenues are not completely exogenous, and credit sales, in particular, may be manipulated
by managers extending generous credit to induce sales. Hence, we calculate expected total
accruals from the fitted equation using the Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney’s (1995) modifica-
tion of excluding increases in trade receivables from the change in revenues. The remaining
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residual accruals are considered subject to managerial control, and are termed abnormal
total accruals.
In our term-adjusted extension to the Jones model, we first estimate expected current
accruals by cross-sectionally regressing current (not total) accruals on only the change in
sales revenues. The expected current accruals is calculated using the estimated coefficients
in the fitted equation after subtracting the change in trade receivables from the change in
sales revenues. The residual of current accruals is the abnormal current accruals. For
long-term accruals, the expected component is calculated as expected total accruals minus
expected current accruals. Long-term accruals minus expected long-term accruals is then
abnormal long-term accruals. To summarize, abnormal current and long-term accruals
proxy for the degree of earnings management, whereas expected accruals proxy for the
normal accruals taken in response to changes in economic conditions.
We estimate the Jones and term-adjusted Jones regressions cross-sectionally for a sample
of all firms in the same 2-digit SIC code as the IPO firm, but excluding IPOs in our test
sample. The cross-sectional regression is re-estimated for each fiscal year under consider-
ation. At least 10 observations must be available before the regression is performed. The
cross-sectional approach was introduced by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), and we use
the approach because a time series approach is infeasible for IPOs. The cross-sectional
approach has an additional advantage in that it incorporates changes in accruals resulting
from changes in economic conditions for the industry as a whole. An IPO is generally
associated with major changes in investment opportunities for the firm and industry, and
these economic changes can influence IPO firm accruals independent of any manipula-
tion. Since the cross-sectional regression is re-estimated each year, specific year changes
in economic conditions affecting expected accruals are filtered out. As mentioned previ-
ously, IPOs cluster in time and industry, which might lead to patterns of accruals resulting
from random industry factors at a given time and unrelated to accrual manipulation during
the IPO process. In addition, the common practice by underwriters of comparing market
prices and accounting variables of similar firms when pricing equity (see DeAngelo (1990))
further underscores the importance of extracting industry-wide economic conditions from
abnormal accruals.
2.1.2. Matched-Pair Proxy
The appropriate benchmark for expected accruals has been a controversial subject of debate
recently in the accounting literature.13 Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) report from a
simulation study that the model exhibits the most power among currently available models
in detecting earnings management. However, they point out that the model rejects too
often for extreme performing firms. Since it is likely that IPO firms have unusual earnings
performance at the time of the IPO, we use a second proxy for earnings management to
attempt to control directly for this purported key weakness of the model.
In this alternative matched-pair design, each IPO firm is matched to a non-issuing firm
from the same industry with comparable earnings performance as the IPO firm during the
issue year. The matched firm is selected from non-issuing firms in the same four-digit SIC
code as the IPO firm if it has the closest return on sales to the IPO firm during the IPO year.
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The return on sales of the matched firm can be no smaller than 80% of the IPO firm’s issue
year return on sales. If no matches are found within the four-digit SIC codes, we consider
three-digit, then two-digit, and finally one-digit codes. The majority (72%) of IPO firms is
matched successfully on at least the three-digit SIC codes.
The term-adjusted Jones model abnormal current and long-term accruals are calculated
for both the IPO firm and its match. The matched-pair abnormal accruals is calculated as
the IPO abnormal accruals minus the matched firm abnormal accruals. The key advantage
of the matched-pair approach is that systematic errors in the Jones model abnormal accruals
for similar performing firms are eliminated. The disadvantage is that the approach may be
too conservative in measuring earnings management if high performing non-issuers have
alternative incentives to engage in earnings manipulation. For example, Beneish (1994)
reports that high growing firms have strong incentives to manipulate financial statements
to allay the perception of growth deceleration.
Our procedure is able to obtain close matches for most of the IPO firms. The mean
sales growthrate is 116% for the IPO sample and 115% for the matched sample; the
median growth rates are 40% for the IPO firms versus 33% for the matched firms. The test
statistics for the difference in mean and medians of the two distributions are not statistically
significant.
2.1.3. Beneish M-score
The third proxy for earnings management uses the Beneish (1994) model to estimate a score
for the likelihood that the firm is a manipulator. The Beneish model is estimated from a
sample of known GAAP violators investigated by the SEC for financial fraud.14 The eight
variables and their loadings to compute the M-score are:
M = −4.840+ .920 Days sales in receivable+ .528 Gross margin
+ .404 Asset quality+ .892 Sales growth+ .115 Depreciation
− .172 SGA+ 4.679 Accruals− .327 Leverage index. (1)
The variables are defined in the note below.15
Higher values for the Beneish M-score imply a greater likelihood that the firm is a ma-
nipulator. The M-score includes accrual measures, and so is not independent of the other
two measures of earnings management. It has the advantage of being more comprehensive
by incorporating other earnings quality measures that are useful to investors for predicting
future earnings. One potential disadvantage is that the model is specifically estimated from
GAAP violators whereas our IPO sample are generally not violators. By including other
factors, the score may also not strictly reflect the degree of opportunistic manipulation under
managerial control.
3. Post-Issue Earnings Underperformance
In this section, we examine whether IPO firms’ earnings underperform post-issue. Table 2
and Figure 1 report on the time series pattern from the issue year (year 0) to six years
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Table 2.Time series profile of return on sales (in %) from fiscal year of IPO to six years after.
Panel A: Return on Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6••••
Median 4.62∗∗∗ 2.78∗ 2.09 1.57 1.29 1.29 1.84
Mean −6.72∗∗∗ −8.47∗∗∗ −7.30∗∗∗ −5.66∗∗∗ −6.43∗∗∗ −5.12∗∗∗ −3.71∗∗∗
% Positive 0.76∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.59 0.59 0.62
Observations 1514 •1421 1279 1105 943 690 429•••
Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Return on Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6••••
Median 1.99∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
Mean −9.70∗∗∗ −10.91∗∗∗ −9.49∗∗∗ −7.56∗∗∗ −7.86∗∗∗ −6.49∗∗∗ −5.09∗∗∗
% Positive 0.65∗∗∗ 0.52∗ 0.50 0.49 0.47∗∗ 0.48 0.51
Observations 1514 •1419 1279 1105 942 690 429•••
Panel C: Performance-Matched Return on Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6••••
Median 0.00 −0.46∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
Mean −0.10∗∗ −1.84∗∗∗ −3.12∗∗∗ −2.08∗∗∗ −3.99∗∗∗ −2.17∗∗∗ −3.76∗∗∗
% Positive 0.50 0.45∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
Observations 1514 •1313 1095 897 712 489 288•••
Note:
This table presents three measures of net income performance from the fiscal year of the offering to six years after.
Panel A reports on return of sales, and Panel B the IPO firm’s return on sales minus the industry median return
on sales. In Panel C, IPO firms are first matched to non-IPO firms from the same industry and have the closest
to at least 80% of offering-year return on sales of the IPO firm. The performance measure is calculated as the
difference between return on sales of IPO firm and matched firm.
The means are trimmed at+/−5%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively,
two-tailed, based on T distribution for means, Wilcoxon for median, and normal approximation to the binomial
with continuity correction for the sign tests.
thereafter of three measures of earnings performance.16 Panel A reports on the IPO return
on sales, and Panel B on the industry-adjusted return on sales (i.e., IPO return on sales minus
the industry median return on sales). Adjusting for changing industry conditions may be
important because Ritter (1991) reported significant declines in operating performance for
some industries in the 1980s. In Panel C, the performance measure is relative to the matched
firm selected as described in section 2.1.2., and is calculated as the IPO firm’s return on sales
minus the matched firm’s return on sales. In all panels, the statistical means are obtained
after trimming the data at the fifth and 95th percentiles to reduce the effect of a few large
values on the mean statistic. Qualitative results using winsorizing are similar.
Table 2 indicates that the median return on sales peaks in the issue year for all three
measures. Some skewness is indicated in the sample by the significant negative mean
measures, so we rely on the medians for statistical inference. Year 0 return on sales is
significantly positive in Panels A and B, and exceeds performance in all other post-issue
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Figure 1. Time series profile of median return on sales.
years. Since firms are matched by performance in year 0, the median matched-return on
sales in Panel C is zero for year 0. For post-issue performance relative to year 0, IPO return
on sales in year 1 drops 40% in panel A and the industry-adjusted return on sales drops
79% in panel B. The slide continues each year for the next four to five years. By year 4,
the median IPO return on sales is only 28% of year 0 value. The median industry-adjusted
return on sales becomes significantly negative by year 3 and continues to be significantly
negative for years 4 and 5. Panel C indicates that IPO firms perform significantly worse than
their matched firms in all post-issue years. The medians and means are all significantly
negative, and a significant majority of the IPO firms earns less than the matched firms.
Further evidence reported in Table 4 shows that IPO firms significantly underperform their
prior-performance matched non-issuers by a margin of as much as 16.50% (mean) and
8.28% (median) over the entire three immediate post-IPO years relative to year 0.
It is possible that the return on sales may decline in post-issue years because higher sales
are generated from new investments. However, we show that the post-issue underperfor-
mance is not special to the use of return on sales as the performance measure. A similar
pattern of a post-IPO decline is also observed when return on assets is the performance
measure. In contrast to return on sales, return on assets may be expected to be lower in
the IPO year than in subsequent years, absent manipulation considerations. Total assets
incorporate the increase in assets from IPO proceeds immediately, whereas margins are
likely lower on temporary investments where initial proceeds are parked.17 Furthermore,
the post-IPO decline in performance is also observed when a constant denominator, total
assets in year 0, is used as the performance deflator for all years from 0 through 6. In sum,
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Figure 2. Time series profile of abnormal accruals and expected accruals.
IPO firms report superior earnings performance in the issue year which are not sustained.
Their earnings significantly underperform in the post-issue periods.
3.1. Time Series Pattern of Accruals
We examine next whether the time series pattern of earnings in Table 2 may be derived
from a similar time series pattern for abnormal accruals. Figure 2 and Table 3 present the
time series profiles of abnormal and expected accruals from the issue year to six years after.
Abnormal and expected total accruals are presented in Panel A and Matched-pair abnormal
and expected accruals in Panel B.
Abnormal accruals in both panels peak in year 0 and then decline steadily, turning from
significantly positive in year 0 of about 5.5% to negative in year 2 for Panel A and in year 3
for Panel B. In both panels, a similar pattern of steady decline from the issue year is also
observed for expected accruals but the magnitudes of the declines are much less dramatic
than for abnormal accruals. This evidence is consistent with a scenario where the managers
of IPO firms opportunistically advance accruals so as to improve reported earnings during
the issue period. Subsequently, when the high level of issue-year abnormal accruals cannot
be sustained in the post-issue years, reported net incomes decline.
Further alternative methods for measuring abnormal accruals are considered. They are:
matching by sales growth rates instead of return on sales for the matched-pair proxies;
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Table 3.Time series profile of asset-scaled abnormal and expected accruals, in percent, from fiscal year of IPO to
six years after.
Panel A: Non-Matched Accruals
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6••••
Abnormal Accruals
Median 5.50∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ −0.35∗ −0.80∗∗ −1.95∗∗∗ −1.40∗∗∗ −2.70∗∗∗
Mean 9.94∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗ −3.40∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗ −3.07∗∗∗
% Positive 0.62∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
Observations 1506 1408 1282 1147 998 841 585•••••
Expected Accruals
Median −0.80 −1.80∗∗∗ −2.50∗∗∗ −2.90∗∗∗ −3.20∗∗∗ −4.00∗∗∗ −3.85∗∗∗
Mean 1.13∗∗∗ −1.67∗∗∗ −2.86∗∗∗ −3.90∗∗∗ −3.66∗∗∗ −4.59∗∗∗ −4.33∗∗∗
% Positive 0.46∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Observations 1506 1408 1282 1147 997 841 584•••••
Panel B: Matched-Pair Accruals
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6••••
Matched-pair Abnormal Accruals
Median 5.87∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 0.38 −0.28 −1.69∗∗∗ −0.15 −2.94∗∗∗
Mean 10.73∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗ 0.18 0.47 −1.91∗∗∗ −1.22∗∗ −3.95∗∗∗
% Positive 0.62∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.51 0.49 0.44∗∗∗ 0.49 0.40∗∗∗
Observations 1480 1283 1083 904 732 579 365•••••
Matched-pair Expected Accruals
Median 1.87∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.43 0.11
Mean 4.39∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.57∗ 0.84∗∗
% Positive 0.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.53∗ 0.52
Observations 1480 1283 1083 904 732 579 365•••••
Note:
In Panel A, expected accruals are estimated each year from a cross-sectional regression of total accruals on the
change in sales and level of property, plant, and equipment using all non-issuing firms in the same 2-digit SIC
code as the IPO firm. Expected accruals are the predicted accruals after subtracting change in accounts receivables
from change in sales. Abnormal accruals are total accruals minus expected accruals.
In Panel B, each IPO firm is matched with an industry non-issuing peer with the closest to at least 80% of the
offering-year return on sales of the IPO firm. The matching procedure begins from the same 4-digit SIC codes,
and when no match is found, firms with the same 3-digit, then 2-digit, and finally 1-digit SIC codes are used.
Matched abnormal accruals is the abnormal accruals of the IPO firm minus the abnormal accruals of the matched
firm.
The means are trimmed at+/−5%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively,
two-tailed, based on T distribution for means, Wilcoxon for median, and normal approximation to the binomial
with continuity correction for the sign tests.
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calculating abnormal accruals from regressions estimated using only industry peers with
the highest growth rates instead of all peers; and deflating accruals by only pre-issue year
total assets throughout the six post-issue years instead of lagged year assets (so the post-
issue decline in abnormal accruals is not a result of growth in the deflator). The results are
all robust to these alternative specifications.
3.2. Post-Issue Earnings by Abnormal Accruals Quartiles
Next, we examine whether post-issue earnings performance of IPO firms differs systemat-
ically according to the magnitude of the IPO-year abnormal accruals. We rank IPO firms
by their IPO-year abnormal accruals and report the earnings performance in Table 4 for the
extreme two quartiles, aggressive for largest abnormal accruals and conservative for small-
est abnormal accruals. For expositional simplicity, we report only performance-matched
return on sales; similar results are obtained for the industry-adjusted return on sales. The
performance measure in Panel A is the difference in return on sales between IPO firms and
their matches. In Panel B, the cumulative excess return on sales for years 1 to 3 relative to
year 0 is computed as the difference in the sum of the changes in return on sales in years 1,
2, and 3 relative to base year 0 between IPO firms and their matches.
Panel A in Table 4 shows that only IPO firms in the aggressive quartile consistently
underperform their matched non-issuers in each of the six post-issue years. Both median
and mean measures are all statistically significantly negative in each of the six years and
a significant majority of the IPO firms underperforms the matched firms. Panel B reports
that the median (mean) cumulative earnings underperformance for the aggressive quartile
firms in the first three years after issue is a statistically significant−8.28% (−16.50%) of
sales. Furthermore, a significant majority (65%) of the aggressive IPO firms has cumulative
earnings less than their non-issuing matches.
In contrast, no significant underperformance is observed for the conservative quartile.
The performance-matched returns on sales are generally insignificantly different between
the IPO firms and their matches. Panel B reports a median zero cumulative excess return on
sales for conservative accruers, and conservative accruers outperform aggressive accruers
by about four-fold based on mean statistics. Finally, about as many conservative IPOs earn
higher return on sales than their matches as the number earning lower return on sales than
their matches.
In sum, the evidence indicates that reported earnings of aggressive accruers are high in
the issue year because of high abnormal accruals. The high issue year earnings are not
sustained subsequently when the accruals are undone. This evidence is consistent with
opportunistic earnings management by the aggressive accruers.
For further evidence that abnormal accruals drive the earnings profile of IPO firms, we
examine the time profile of the non-accrual component of net income, the cash flows
from operations. The IPO firm’s cash flows from operations/sales are compared with its
matched non-issuer in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 suggests poor liquidity as a reason
for going public. The IPO firm’s liquidity remains low butimprovesover the four years
after issue relative to the matched firm. Furthermore, Panel B in Table 5 shows that the
conservative quartile of IPO firms has worsening cash flows in the post-issue periods while
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Table 4.Post-issue performance-matched return on sales between conservative and aggressive abnormal accrual
quartiles of IPO firms.
Panel A: Performance-matched Return on Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Conservative Quartile of IPO firms
Median −0.02 0.08 0.00 −0.64 −1.27 −0.53∗ 0.25
Mean 0.22 −0.24 −4.76∗∗∗ −1.39 −2.08∗ −3.86 0.03
% Positive 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.53
No. Obs. 379 325 •271 217 171 •120 73
Aggressive Quartiles of IPO firms
Median 0.01 −1.84∗∗∗ −2.36∗∗∗ −1.94∗∗∗ −1.25∗∗∗ −1.09∗ −4.72∗∗∗
Mean −0.03 −7.13∗∗∗ −9.57∗∗∗ −3.57∗∗ −8.30∗∗∗ −3.80∗ −7.41∗∗∗
% Positive 0.52 0.40∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46 0.45 0.30∗∗∗
No. Obs. 379 320 •274 229 169 •114 71
Panel B: Cumulative Excess Performance-matched Return on Sales from Years 1 to 3 relative to Year 0
ALL Conservative Aggressive
Median −1.88∗∗∗ 0.00 −8.28∗∗∗
Prob(|M | > 0) 0.00 0.97 0.00
Mean −4.68∗∗∗ −4.55 −16.50∗∗∗
Prob(|T | > 0) 0.00 0.12 0.00
%> 0 ••44%∗∗∗ 51% ••35%∗∗∗
Binprob(%, .5,2) 0.00 1.00 0.00
Note:
This table compares the post-IPO return on sales performance between extreme quartiles of IPO firms ranked by
abnormal accruals in the fiscal year of offering; Conservative quartiles have the smallest, and Aggressive quartiles
have the largest, issue-year abnormal accruals. The performance measure in Panel A is the difference in return
on sales between IPO firms and their matches. In Panel B, the cumulative excess return on sales is computed as
the difference in the sum of the changes in return on sales in years 1, 2, and 3 relative to base year 0 between IPO
firms and their matches.
The means are trimmed at+/−5%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively,
two-tailed, based on T distribution for means, Wilcoxon for median, and normal approximation to the binomial
with continuity correction for the sign tests.
Table 4 indicates no earnings underperformance for this sub-group. In contrast, Panel C
in Table 5 reports post-issue improving cash flow performance for the aggressive quartile
while Table 4 reports greater post-issue earnings underperformance for this sub-group. The
conflicting cash flow performance from earnings performance confirms that the post-issue
earnings underperformance is not derived from cash flow underperformance in the same
period.
The following picture emerges, taking together all the evidence on the pattern of accruals,
net income, and cash flows from operations. The exceptionally high net income during the
IPO year comes from exceptionally high abnormal accruals, not cash flows from operations.
In subsequent years, the decline in net income is caused by a decline in abnormal accruals,
not cash flows from operations. In sum, net income is high during the issue year because of
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Table 5.Post-issue performance-matched cash flows from operations/sales, in percent, from fiscal year of IPO to
six years after.
Panel A: ALL IPO Firms
Level of Performance-Matched Cash Flows from Operations/Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Median −5.65∗∗∗ −4.22∗∗∗ −2.01∗∗∗ −1.42∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −1.04∗∗∗ −0.52
Mean −9.28∗∗∗ −7.41∗∗∗ −3.92∗∗∗ −2.52∗∗∗ −2.14∗∗∗ −2.05∗∗∗ −0.80
% Positive 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.45∗∗
No. Obs. 1507 1303 1090 885 709 486 287
Panel B: Conservative Abnormal Accruals Quartile of IPO Firms
Level of Performance-Matched Cash Flows from Operations/Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Median 1.48∗∗∗ −3.82∗∗∗ −0.72∗ −1.84∗∗∗ −1.51 −0.42 0.03
Mean 6.32∗∗∗ −8.44∗∗∗ −4.93∗∗∗ −5.18∗∗∗ −2.21 0.16 2.00
% Positive 0.56∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.48 0.45∗ 0.45 0.49 0.51
No. Obs. 375 322 270 215 171 119 73
Change in Performance-Matched Cash Flows from Operations/Sales
Year · (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) (5,6)
Median · −5.99∗∗∗ 0.62 0.03 2.08 −0.75 0.73
Mean · −17.17∗∗∗ 0.34 −1.27 2.64 0.19 −1.15
% Positive · 0.37∗∗∗ 0.53 0.50 0.55∗ 0.46 0.55
No. Obs. · 320 266 214 169 116 71
Panel C: Aggressive Abnormal Accruals Quartile of IPO Firms
Level of Performance-Matched Cash Flows from Operations/Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Median −23.99∗∗∗ −8.21∗∗∗ −5.25∗∗∗ −3.60∗∗∗ −3.25∗∗∗ −4.38∗∗∗ −3.84∗∗∗
Mean −33.12∗∗∗ −14.37∗∗∗ −9.25∗∗∗ −2.72∗ −6.03∗∗∗ −5.74∗∗∗ −4.28∗∗∗
% Positive 0.08∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
No. Obs. 378 319 273 225 166 112 70
Change in Performance-Matched Cash Flows from Operations/Sales
Year · (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) (5,6)
Median · 9.01∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 1.17 0.08 1.27 0.00
Mean · 15.43∗∗∗ 7.05∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗ 0.33 0.91 3.20
% Positive · 0.67∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.54 0.51 0.55 0.52
No. Obs. · 319 270 222 166 109 69
Note:
This table presents cash flows from operations/sales from the fiscal year of the offering to six years after for all IPO
firms, and for the Aggressive and Conservative abnormal accruals quartiles of IPO firms. The Aggressive quartile
IPOs have the largest IPO-year abnormal accruals and the Conservative quartile IPOs have the lowest IPO-year
abnormal accruals. The performance measures are the level and change in cash flows from operations/sales of
IPO firms relative to their matches. The matched firms are selected as in Table 2. Panel A reports on all IPO firms;
Panels B and C report on the Conservative and Aggressive quartiles.
The means are trimmed at+/−5%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively,
two-tailed, based on T distribution for means, Wilcoxon for median, and normal approximation to the binomial
with continuity correction for the sign tests.
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abnormal accruals. When the high issue-year abnormal accruals cannot be sustained into
post-issue years, the earnings of IPO firms underperform.18
4. Predicting Post-Issue Earnings Underperformance
4.1. Simple Correlation Tests
In this section, we test whether the IPO-year abnormal accruals predict the earnings under-
performance in subsequent years. Table 6 reports the Spearman rank correlations of the
IPO-year matched-pair abnormal accruals and the Beneish M-score with the performance-
matched return on sales in Panel A and with changes in the performance-matched return on
sales relative to base year 0 in Panel B.19 For comparison, we also include correlations of
earnings performance measures with expected accruals.
Table 6 shows that the IPO-year abnormal accruals are significantly negatively correlated
with both the levels and changes in return on sales in each of the post-issue years. In contrast,
expected accruals are not correlated with the levels or changes in return on sales in any of the
post-issue years except one. The Beneish M-score is consistently negatively correlated with
the levels and changes in return on sales, but with lower estimated correlations and statistical
significance.20 This suggests that firms which are more likely to be manipulators during an
IPO perform worse after the issue. Table 6 also presents correlations of post-issue earnings
performance with cash flows from operations in the issue year. Cash flows from operations
are positively associated with future income, and so are not contributing to the negative
relation between the IPO-year abnormal accruals and future earnings performance. Thus,
the evidence of negative correlations in Table 6 is consistent with opportunistic accruals
management.
4.2. Regression Analyses
Next, we turn to cross-sectional regression analyses where we decompose the relative
explanatory power of the four accruals variables (abnormal current and long-term accruals,
and expected current and long-term accruals) for the earnings underperformance. Two
dependent variables are considered in the regressions: the mean level of return on sales in
years 1 through 3, and the change in return on sales in years 1 through 3 relative to base
year 0.21
Besides the four accruals variables, we also include two other independent variables in
the regression, the IPO-year cash flows from operations and capital expenditures. Cash
flows from operations/sales are included to remove potential spurious correlations between
the accruals variables and future earnings performance induced by contemporaneous corre-
lations between the accruals and cash flows from operations in the IPO year. Cheng (1995)
reports empirical evidence that firms which invest the proceeds from seasoned equity offer-
ings experience less post-offering underperformance. Capital expenditures are calculated
as the mean capital expenditures (item 128) in years 1 through 3 minus the mean capital
expenditures in years−1 and 0, scaled by IPO-year total assets. According to Cheng’s
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Table 6. Spearman rank order correlations of performance-matched return on sales with IPO year matched-pair
abnormal and expected accruals, Beneish M-score, and cash flows from operations/s les.
Panel A: Correlations with Level of Performance-Matched Return on Sales
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Matched-pair
Abnormal Accruals 0.02 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.13∗∗
P-value 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Observations 1644 1428 1191 976 775 531 313
Matched-pair
Expected Accruals −0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07∗∗ 0.02 −0.01 0.02
P-value 0.77 0.16 0.39 0.03 0.56 0.82 0.70
Observations 1644 1428 1191 976 775 531 313
Beneish M-score 0.04 −0.07∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 −0.08∗∗ −0.07 −0.19∗∗∗
P-value 0.15 0.02 0.46 0.85 0.05 0.13 0.00
Observations 1302 1145 964 798 626 436 267
Cash Flows From
Operations/Sales 0.10∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.00
Observations 1673 1450 1208 990 785 538 317
Panel B: Correlations with Changes in Performance-Matched Return on Sales Relative to
IPO-Year Return on Sales
Year (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,6)
Matched-pair
Abnormal Accruals −0.14∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.13∗∗
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02
Observations 1428 1191 976 775 531 313
Matched-pair
Expected Accruals 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 −0.03 0.01
P-value 0.41 0.82 0.11 0.87 0.49 0.84
Observations 1428 1191 976 775 531 313
Beneish M-score −0.08∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.02 −0.06 −0.06 −0.20∗∗∗
P-value 0.00 0.20 0.66 0.11 0.18 0.00
Observations 1145 964 798 626 436 267
Cash Flows From
Operations/Sales 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.16∗∗∗
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.44 0.24 0.01
Observations 1450 1208 990 785 538 317
Note:
This table presents Spearman rank order correlations between performance-matched levels and changes in return
on sales with abnormal and expected accruals, Beneish M-score, and performance-matched cash flows from
operations/sales. Correlations with levels of return on sales from years 0 through 6 are in the top panel, and
correlations with changes in return on sales from years 1 through 6 relative to year 0 are in the bottom panel.
The performance-matched return on sales is the difference in performance-matched return on sales between IPO
firms and the matched firm, as described in Table 2. The matched-pair asset-scaled abnormal and expected
accruals are measured using the matched-pair model described in Table 3. The Beneish M-score is calculated as
in equation (1) in the text. The performance-matched cash flows from operations/sale is the difference in cash
flows from operations/sales between IPO firm and its matched firm.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, two-tailed.
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hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on capital expenditures in our regression is predicted
to be positive.
Table 7 reports that the IPO year abnormal current accruals have the greatest predictive
power for post-IPO earnings performance. The estimated coefficients on the abnormal
current accruals variables are highly significantly negative, and are several orders of magni-
tude larger than the coefficients on the other accruals variables in absolute terms. Abnormal
long-term accruals also predict future return on sales but not the decline in return on sales.
In contrast, expected current or long-term accruals do not significantly predict future earn-
ings performance. Like abnormal current accruals, the Beneish M-score also significantly
predicts post-issue earnings underperformance. In all the regressions, the capital expendi-
ture variable confirms Cheng’s finding that IPO firms which invest the proceeds perform
better post-issue. Finally, firms with high IPO-year cash flows from operations have high
post-IPO return on sales and deterioration in the margins relative to the IPO year.
We also perform the cross-sectional regressions annually from 1989 to 1990 to reduce
potential cross-correlation among the observations induced by year-specific economic con-
ditions affecting both the earnings management measures and earnings performance. Ta-
ble 8 presents summary statistics of the annual cross-sectional regressions. The t-statistics
are based on the time-series standard deviations of the estimated coefficients. The results
confirm the findings in the previous table. Among the four accruals measures, abnormal
current accruals again dominate in terms of predictive power for future earnings perfor-
mance. The Beneish M-score continues to have incremental explanatory power for future
earnings performance. As before, the expected accruals do not have predictive power for
future returns.
The contrast in the predictive power of abnormal accruals versus expected accruals in
both the correlation and regression tests is important for our study. Any empirical model,
such as the Jones (1991) model, will to some extent misclassify discretionary and non-
discretionary components. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that the relation between
discretionary accruals and the variable of interest may have been induced by the non-
discretionary component. Since we find that expected accruals have no explanatory power
for future earnings performance, spurious correlation seems unlikely. Any remaining non-
discretionary component in abnormal accruals would, at worst, merely add noise to our
abnormal accruals measure rather than induce bias in the estimated coefficient on abnormal
accruals.
Furthermore, Subramanyam (1996) reports that discretionary and non-discretionary Jones
model accruals arepositivelyassociated with one-year, two-year, and three-year ahead earn-
ings. Thus, any induced spurious effects from the presence of non-discretionary accruals in
our abnormal accruals measure would likely bias against our finding ane tivecorrelation
between abnormal accruals and subsequent earnings.
In addition, the contrast in our finding of a negative relation between abnormal accruals
and subsequent earnings for IPO firms versus Subramanyam’s positive relation for the
average firm in the population is interesting for the earnings management hypothesis. All
accruals ultimately reverse since accruals sum to zero within the life of the firm. The positive
association reported by Subramanyam suggests that any potential reversal in future accruals
does not result in lower future earnings for the average firm in the population because any
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Table 7.Cross-sectional regressions predicting post-issue net income underperformance with
IPO-year accruals, Beneish M-score, cash flows from operations, and capital expenditures.
Dependent Variables
Performance-Matched Return on Sales
Mean Level in Years 1–3 Mean Change in Years 1–3
Relative to Year 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables Parameter Estimates Parameter Estimates
(T-statistics) (T-statistics)
Abnormal Current Accruals −0.17∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(−6.46) (−7.80)
Abnormal Long-term Accruals −0.11∗∗ −0.06
(−1.98) (−1.06)
Expected Current Accruals −0.00 −0.01
(−0.12) (−0.21)
Expected Long-term Accruals 0.06 0.12∗
(0.89) (1.76)
Cash Flows from Operations 0.00∗∗ 0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.47) (0.79) (−2.87) (−1.99)
Capital Expenditures 0.07 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(2.19) (3.80) (3.85) (4.26)
Beneish M-score −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(−4.10) (−4.60)
Regression Statistics
Adjusted R-square 4.37% 3.86% 7.15% 4.86%
F-statistics 2.90 2.51 4.19 2.93
Prob(F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Number of Observations 1286 1059 1286 1054
Note:
This table presents results from four cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable in
the first two regressions is the mean level of the return on sales in years 1 to 3, and in the
next two regressions is the mean change in return on sales in years 1 to 3 relative to base
year 0 (= fiscal year of IPO). The key independent variables in the first and third regressions
are the four term-adjusted Jones model asset-scaled accruals variables (abnormal current
accruals, abnormal long-term accruals, expected current accruals, and expected long-term
accruals) in year 0, and in the second and fourth regressions is the Beneish M-score. The
accruals variables and the Beneish M-scores are trimmed at the fifth and 95th percentiles. All
four regressions include the following control variables: cash flows from operations/sale in
year 0, capital expenditure growth (calculated as the mean capital expenditures in years 1 to 3
minus the mean capital expenditures in year−1 and 0), and a set of year and industry dummies
(representing the industry groups listed in Table 1) which are not reported. Performance-
matched return on sales and cash flows from operations/sales are used, accrual measures
are from the matched-pair model, and Beneish M-score is as described in equation (1) in the
text. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, two-tailed,
respectively.
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Table 8.Annual cross-sectional regressions predicting post-issue net income underperfor-
mance using IPO-year accruals and Beneish M-score.
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Mean Level of Performance-matched Return on Sales in
Years 1 to 3
Independent Variables Mean T-statistics Mean T-statistics
Abnormal current accruals −0.09∗∗ −2.32
Abnormal long-term accruals −0.07 −1.69
Expected current accruals 0.01 0.42
Expected long-term accruals 0.02 0.50
Cash flows from operations 0.05 1.41 0.05∗∗∗ 2.69
Capital expenditures 0.10∗∗∗ 3.36 0.18∗∗∗ 3.42
Beneish M-score −0.01∗∗ −2.44
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Mean Change in Performance-matched Return on Sales
in Years 1 to 3 relative to Year 0
Independent Variables Mean T-statistics Mean T-statistics
Abnormal current accruals −0.11∗∗∗ −2.86
Abnormal long-term accruals −0.06 −1.49
Expected current accruals −0.01 −0.39
Expected long-term accruals 0.00 0.05
Cash flows from operations 0.03 0.88 0.07∗∗∗ 3.95
Capital expenditures 0.11∗∗∗ 3.60 0.19∗∗∗ 3.66
Beneish M-score −0.01∗ −1.93
Note:
This table presents the summary statistics of year-by-year regressions from 1980 to 1990.
The dependent and independent variables are as described in Table 7. The accruals
variables and Beneish M-scores are trimmed at the fifth and 95th percentiles. The time-
series mean of the estimated coefficients is reported. The T-statistic is based on time-series
standard deviation of the estimated coefficients.∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ represent significance levels
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, two-tailed, respectively.
reversal in accruals may be more than compensated for by contemporaneous new accruals.
(No net reversals are expected for steady-state firms and net increases in accruals, instead,
are expected for growth firms.) In contrast, if the IPO-year accruals are opportunistically
managed, their reversal in subsequent periods may be so large as to dominate any new
accruals, resulting in a net reversal of accruals and hence a decline in future earnings.22
To summarize, we find that the earnings management proxies in the year of going public
forecast the long-term decline in post-issue earnings performance, consistent with op-
portunistic earnings management. Abnormal current accruals has the greatest consistent
explanatory power among all the proxies, perhaps because it is the component most easily
subject to successful managerial manipulation.
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5. Do Abnormal Accruals Predict Future Stock Returns?
We have so far focused on examining whether information contained in the IPO-year fi-
nancial report, particularly in items related to abnormal accruals, is useful for predicting
future earnings. We now evaluate whether investors understand and interpret this informa-
tion correctly for valuing the IPO firm. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) find that
abnormal accruals have predictive power for stock returns after IPOs and seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs), but that expected accruals do not. We provide here a robustness check on
these results by examining whether post-IPO-year abnormal stock returns are predictable
based on IPO-year expected accruals, abnormal accruals, and the Beneish M-score for our
IPO sample, which covers a partially different time period from Teoh, Welch, and Wong
(1998a). The predictive ability of the Beneish M-score for long-term future stock returns
has not been studied previously.
We rank IPO firms by each of the three variables (abnormal accruals, expected accruals,
and M-score) separately into quartile groups Q1 through Q4. Q1 has the lowest of the
partitioning variables and Q4 the highest. For each quartile, the market-adjusted stock
returns are computed for three 12-month holding periods beginning in the fourth month
of fiscal years 1, 2, and 3, and one 36-month period beginning in the fourth month after
the IPO fiscal year end. The market-adjusted returns for each IPO firm are computed as
the IPO buy-and-hold returns minus the equivalent period CRSP value-weighted market
index. Averaging over the market-adjusted returns for the IPO firms gives the quartile
market-adjusted returns. These returns are graphed in Figure 3 and reported in Table 9.
The p-values for the difference in the market-adjusted returns between Q1 and Q4 are also
reported.
The results in Table 9, Panels A and B, confirm the ability of expected and abnormal
accruals to predict post-issue stock returns. Panel A of Table 9 reports that the aggres-
sive abnormal accruals quartile Q4 consistently earns poorer market-adjusted returns in all
holding periods relative to the conservative quartile Q1. The difference is statistically sig-
nificant in all the holding periods. (When the holding period is extended to the fourth year,
the difference in the fourth year is not significant.) Over the 36-month holding period, the
market-adjusted returns are−52% for Q4 and only−21% for Q1, indicating that aggres-
sive IPO firms underperform conservative IPO firms by about 31%. A similar magnitude
underperformance (29%) is observed when annual rebalanced market-adjusted returns are
used; the market-adjusted returns are−44% for Q4 and−15% for Q1. As reported by Teoh,
Welch, and Wong (1998a), expected accruals exhibit no predictive power. Panel B shows
that in all holding periods, the four quartiles earn about the same market-adjusted returns.
Panel C of Table 9 reports on the Beneish M-score’s predictive ability for future returns.
Before we discuss the results, note that the mean M-score is about 2.8, median is−1.19.
These scores suggest that a significant majority of IPO firms are considered likely ma-
nipulators by the Beneish model. Panel C indicates that the aggressive M-score quartile
Q4 consistently underperforms the conservative quartile Q1. Over the 36-month holding
period, Q4 underperforms by 32%, which is similar to that reported in Panel A. On an
annual basis, the difference between Q1 and Q4 is less significant for Panel C than Panel A,
suggesting possibly greater predictive power for abnormal accruals than the M-score.
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Table 9.Post-issue market-adjusted stock returns in percent by IPO-
year characteristics.
Panel A: By IPO-Year Abnormal Accrual Quartiles
BH1 BH2 BH3 BH13
Q1 Conservative •−4.05 •−6.53 •−5.36 −20.60
Q2 •−5.07 •−1.83 −10.00 −19.57
Q3 −11.35 •−2.29 •−2.30 −28.46
Q4 Aggressive −18.86 −15.41 −18.77 −52.10
p-value (Q1–Q4) –•0.00 –•0.09 –•0.01 –•0.00
Panel B: By IPO-Year Expected Accrual Quartiles
BH1 BH2 BH3 BH13
Q1 Conservative −10.62 •−9.94 •−9.24 −34.49
Q2 •−8.63 •−6.69 •−3.54 −26.39
Q3 −12.77 •−0.90 −11.46 −29.63
Q4 Aggressive •−7.29 •−8.60 -11.74 −30.20
p-value (Q1–Q4) •–0.56 –•0.85 –•0.61 –•0.67
Panel C: By IPO-Year Beneish M-score
BH1 BH2 BH3 BH13
Q1 Conservative •−3.81 •–0.23 •−6.69 −16.69
Q2 •−4.26 •−5.08 •−2.04 −20.54
Q3 −12.77 •−7.56 •−6.77 −30.56
Q4 Aggressive −15.03 −10.75 −19.05 −48.28
p-value (Q1–Q4) •–0.13 –•0.21 –•0.02 –•0.00
Note:
This table reports market-adjusted returns by quartiles ranked on
IPO fiscal-year abnormal and expected asset-scaled accruals, and
the Beneish M-scores in panels A, B, and C respectively. The
abnormal and expected accruals are as defined in Tables 2 and 3,
and the Beneish M-score in Table 6. The market-adjusted returns
are calculated as the buy-and-hold stock returns for the IPO firm
minus the buy-and-hold CRSP value-weighted stock market index
over the equivalent holding period. Market-adjusted returns are
computed over three 12-month holding periods, BH1, BH2, BH3,
for each consecutive year after the IPO fiscal year, and one 36-
month holding period, BH13, for the three years from the IPO
fiscal year. The returns are compounded starting in the fourth
month of the fiscal year to allow for a reporting lag. The market-
adjusted returns for each quartile are obtained by averaging over all
IPOs belonging to the quartile. See Tables 2 and 3 for definitions
of the accruals and net income variables. Two-tailed p-values are
reported for the significance of the t-test between market-adjusted
returns for conservative quartile 1 and aggressive quartile 4. When
the 36-month market-adjusted returns are computed with annual
rebalancing, quartile 4 underperforms quartile 1 in Panels A and
C, but not in Panel B.
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Figure 3. Market-adjusted stock returns by IPO-year abnormal accruals, expected accruals, and Beneish M-score
quartiles.
These results suggest that the market is inefficient with respect to information in IPO-year
abnormal accruals and the Beneish M-score. Together, the results suggest the following
earnings-management based explanation for the long-run stock return anomaly. Oppor-
tunistic accruals at the time of the issue mislead investors into overoptimism about future
earnings prospects. Subsequently, when earnings fall, investors realize that the high issue
accruals were opportunistic and not reflective of fundamentals. As a result, the firm is on
average revalued downwards in the years after the offering.
This explanation is consistent with our combined findings that abnormal accruals are
high in the issue year, and that high abnormal accruals predict both low future earnings and
low future stock market returns. Earnings predictability alone does not necessarily imply
the returns’ predictability or vice versa. For example, even if managers adjust accruals
opportunistically, if investors rationally take this into account there will be no abnormal
stock returns.23 This would lead to abnormal accruals and earnings predictability without
return predictability. Alternatively, investors could fail to account properly for information
in accruals even when there is no opportunism and accruals appropriately reflect future
firm prospects. If so, abnormal accruals would predict future stock returns, and yet not be
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Figure 3. Continued.
negatively related to future earnings. Basically, long-run stock returns are determined by
the direction of market inefficiency (investors’ overoptimism or overpessimism in forming
expectations). In contrast, long-run earnings are unrelated to market inefficiency, and
instead depend solely on whether the event (new issue) is associated with good or bad
prospects for the firm. The joint results of high abnormal issue-year accruals, and abnormal
accruals and M-scores that predict both future earnings and stock returns underperformance,
suggest that investors may have been misled by opportunistic earnings management at the
time of the IPO.
6. Supplementary Analyses of Individual Accounting Items
Given the evidence consistent with opportunistic accruals management, we explore in more
detail two accounting accrual items related to the two key Jones explanatory variables. We
compare depreciation methods and the allowance for bad debts of IPO firms with their
earnings-performance matches in Table 10 and Figure 4. Depreciation methods are ranked
from most income-increasing to least in the following manner: straight-line, combination
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Figure 3. Continued.
of straight-line and accelerated, and accelerated. The depreciation methods of IPO firms
are compared with their matches, and placed in three categories in Panel A depending on
whether the IPO firms’ choices are more or less income-increasing than their matches.
Panel B compares the allowance for bad debts as a fraction of gross accounts receivable
between IPO firms and their matches.
Panel A shows that a majority of IPO firms uses depreciation methods similar to their
matches in all years. That IPO firms generally follow the industry norm is not surprising
since depreciation method choices are relatively more transparent than abnormal accrual
choices. However, Table 10 also shows that a substantial fraction of IPO firms deviate
from their matches (between 30%–40%). Most relevantly, when IPO firms deviate, a sig-
nificant majority (58.8%) uses more income-increasing depreciation than their matches.
The Z-statistic test for significance of the relative fraction of income-increasing to income-
decreasing observations is calculated as the normal approximation to the binomial distri-
bution with continuity correction. While the number of IPO deviants decrease over time,
the Z-statistic remains positive and highly significant throughout the sample window.24
Panel B shows that IPO firms on average allow significantly less for bad debts than the
matched firms in the year before going public and during the offering year. Differences in
both the median and mean statistics are highly significant in years−1 and 0; the magnitude
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Figure 4. IPO median allowance for accounts receivables/gross accounts receivables by abnormal accrual quartiles.
Table 10.Depreciation policy and provision for uncollectible accounts receivable of IPOs in
years−1 through 6 relative to issue year.
Panel A: Depreciation Policy Relative to Matched Firm
Income Decreasing Income Increasing Equivalent Z (Income-
Year # % # % # % increasing)
−1 240 15.2 334 21.1 1008 63.7 3.88∗∗∗
–0 237 14.7 330 20.5 1040 64.7 3.86∗∗∗
–1 197 13.9 299 21.2 •917 64.9 4.54∗∗∗
–2 160 13.4 238 19.9 •798 66.7 3.86∗∗∗
–3 132 13.1 201 20.0 •674 66.9 3.73∗∗∗
–4 103 12.7 163 20.0 •547 67.3 3.62∗∗∗
–5 •72 11.3 124 19.4 •444 69.4 3.64∗∗∗
–6 •47 11.7 •76 18.9 •279 69.4 2.52∗∗∗
of the mean difference is especially large. For post-IPO years, no significant difference in
median statistics for the allowance for bad debt is observed from year+1 onwards, unlike
the results for depreciation choice. Depreciation policy is highly visible, so firms are less
likely to change depreciation policy over time. On the other hand, it is probably quickly
apparent that accounts receivables are uncollectible over time, so a firm is unlikely to get
auditor approval for continued low provision for uncollectibles over a long time period when
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Panel B: Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts Receivable/Gross Accounts Receiv-
ables (%)
Year Median Mean
IPO Match Difference IPO Match Difference
−1 2.80 3.37 −0.23∗∗∗ 6.82 9.90 −2.90∗∗∗
–0 2.91 3.51 −0.16∗∗∗ 6.96 9.24 −1.86∗∗∗
–1 3.32 3.49 0.00 7.57 8.43 −1.43∗∗
–2 3.46 3.50 −0.05 7.18 8.00 −1.53∗∗
–3 3.62 3.57 0.00 6.91 8.07 −1.46∗∗
–4 3.81 3.50 0.20 7.29 7.78 −0.33
–5 3.77 3.46 0.00 6.58 6.94 −0.98∗
–6 3.85 3.55 0.00 7.28 7.05 −0.22
Note:
The depreciation methods are grouped into three categories: accelerated, straight line, and
a combination of straight-line and accelerated. Straight-line is viewed as most income-
increasing, then the combination, and finally accelerated. Thus, the income-increasing
group includes any observation where the IPO firm uses a more income-increasing method
than the matched firm. the income-decreasing group includes observations when the opposite
is true. In the equivalent group, the IPO and matched firm belong to the same depreciation
category.
The Z-statistic tests for significance of whether the fraction of income-increasing firms
among deviant firms (income-increasing and income-decreasing firms) is different from
1/2. It is obtained using the normal approximation with continuity correction to the binomial
distribution. Panel B considers the allowance for bad debts as a fraction of the gross accounts
receivable.∗∗∗, ∗∗, and∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively
using a two-tailed test.
the firm is underperforming. Figure 4 shows an order reversal for allowance for doubtful
accounts receivables/gross accounts receivables across the four abnormal accruals quartiles
over the post-IPO period. In year 0, the provision for bad debts monotonically decreases
across the abnormal current accruals quartiles. The most aggressive accruers provided for
the smallest amount of bad debts and the most conservative provided for the most. By
year 2, this order is flipped so that the provision for bad debts by aggressive accruers now
exceeds that by the conservative accruers. Between years 0 and 2, the aggressive accruers
have increased the provision for bad debts the most, whereas there is no change in provision
for the conservative accruers.
Taken together, the evidence in Table 10 suggests that IPO firms tend to be more aggressive
in their accounting choices. They prefer income-increasing choices in depreciation methods
when they deviate from their similar-performing matches, and generally provide for less
bad debt expenses relative to their accounts receivable than their matches. Such behaviors
are consistent with opportunistic earnings management.25
7. Conclusion
This paper examines the hypothesis that managers select accruals at the time of the IPO
to report high earnings opportunistically. We find evidence consistent with opportunistic
accruals management. During the year of going public, the return on sales of IPO firms is
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significantly higher relative to subsequent years, and relative to non-issuing industry peers.
Post-issue, IPO firms earn significantly less than non-issuing industry peers and previously
similarly-performing matched non-issuers. We provide evidence that this time series pattern
of earnings is derived from a similar time series pattern of abnormal accruals; that is, IPO
firms report high earnings during the IPO by reporting abnormal accruals aggressively.
After issue, when the high abnormal accruals cannot be sustained, the IPO firms’ earnings
underperform relative to their matched firms and non-issuing industry peers. The results
are robust under alternative benchmarks for abnormal accruals.
Most interestingly, we find evidence that our term-adjusted Jones model abnormal ac-
cruals, specifically abnormal current accruals, explains the post-issue underperformance in
earnings. IPO firms with high abnormal current accruals at the time of issue subsequently
underperform most in the three years after the issue. In contrast, expected current and
long-term accruals do not explain the post-issue earnings underperformance. The evidence
on abnormal current accruals contrasts with Subramanyam (1996), who finds in a general
sample (not just IPOs) that high accruals predicth gh future earnings. Teoh, Welch, and
Wong (1998a) find that abnormal accruals predict future stock returns. We find here that
these results are robust to using alternative benchmarks for abnormal accruals.
Additionally, we examine the accounting method choices of the IPO firms during the
year of going public. We find that when compared with similarly performing non-issuing
industry peers, IPO firms use more income-increasing depreciation methods and provide
significantly less for uncollectible accounts receivable. Taken altogether, the evidence is
consistent with firms inflating earnings when going public by opportunistically managing
current accruals. Lastly, our finding of opportunistic accruals and the results in other related
papers offer an earnings management explanation for the new issues anomaly.
These findings are potentially useful to investors, managers, and regulators. Investors are
concerned about how accruals management might affect the long-term future stock returns
of new securities. Managers and issuing firms are concerned about how accruals manage-
ment might affect the cost of equity. If constraints on opportunistic accruals management
are ineffective, then we would expect firm-value-maximizing managers to window-dress
earnings to obtain capital more cheaply. This may be undesirable if the cheap capital comes
at the expense of unwitting investors. Finally, these findings are relevant to accounting and
financial policy regulators who are concerned about the informativeness of accounting num-
bers. The efficiency of the capital market, in part, depends on how accurately accounting
information communicates firm performance.
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Notes
1. We separate accruals into current and long-term components when appropriate to examine whether there are
differential net incentives and opportunities in managing these components.
2. In Section 1, we discuss why earnings management, if it exists, is likely to persist into the issue year.
3. This generalization is based on discussions with the head of the equity syndicate at a large New York underwriter,
and evidence that offer price is positively related to reported earnings per share (see Rao (1993)).
4. An earlier version of the paper examines pre-issue accruals for 130 issuers and finds qualitatively similar
results.
5. The SEC acknowledges that stabilization is a form of price manipulation but permits it in the belief that the
success of firm commitment underwriting depends on the ability of the underwriter to sell securities at or near
the offer price. See Hanley, Kumar, and Seguin (1993) for a description of the regulation of price stabilization
in the IPO market.
6. Beneish (1995) estimates gains to insiders from violating GAAP. He finds that the two predominant incentives
to violating GAAP are associated with new offerings and insider sales subsequent to the offerings. Seven of
the 64 GAAP violators undertook IPOs of which 6 involved insider sales, and 18 undertook seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs) of which 13 involved insider sales. The estimated gain to insiders is $5.9m for IPOs and
$29.2m for SEOs. The estimated gain from insider sales subsequent to IPOs and SEOs are an even larger
amount of $73.9m. Thus, for this sample of violators, there is a strong incentive for managers to sustain
earnings management until after the lock-up period when they can sell their holdings to realize gains.
7. The boilerplate in the prospectus of US IPOs does not include earnings projections, possibly out of the
investment banker’s fear of lawsuits. In the UK, written earnings projections are mandatory.
8. It has been suggested in media articles and it is our impression from conversations with specialists that
underwriter firm analysts are under pressure to forecast high earnings to help establish the underwriter’s
reputation of issuing shares that tend to go “up” in the short run after the offering; see examples and references
in Teoh and Wong (1998).
9. Jay Ritter generously provided an initial sample of IPO firms going public from 1980–84. We supplemented
the sample from Securities Data Co. for firms going public between 1985–1990.
10. Previous empirical studies have reported the presence of earnings management to benefit the firm or manage-
ment in some contexts but not others, and they have differed in the model used for estimating the abnormal
component of accruals. Earnings management has been found to be used to strengthen claims of harm from
foreign imports (Jones, 1991), to reduce regulatory costs imposed by capital ratio requirements on banks
(Moyer, 1990), to loosen debt covenant constraints (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), and to smooth earnings to
time debt-equity swaps (Hand, 1989). Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) report no evidence of earnings manage-
ment prior to an upcoming union negotiation and Pourciau (1993) finds no evidence of earnings management
prior to a non-routine management departure. There is conflicting evidence for whether earnings are managed
to affect executive bonuses and prior to a management buy-out. See Healy (1985), McNichols and Wilson
(1988), Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995), and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) for studies on earnings
management and executive bonuses. Perry and Williams (1994) find evidence of earnings management prior
to management buy-outs, which reverses the evidence reported in DeAngelo (1986).
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11. Cash flows from operations are unavailable from Compustat prior to 1987, and so is computed as the difference
between funds flow from operations (item 110) minus working capital accruals. This definition has been used
by Bowen, Burgstahler, and Daley (1986), and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) among others. Note that cash
flows from operations are estimated as item 110 when working capital accruals are not reported separately in
the funds flow statement (format code for item 318 is 2) or the cash by activity statement (format code for
item 318 is 3) because Compustat already excludes working capital accruals from item 110 in these cases. See
page 111 of Compustat 1994 manual.
12. DeAngelo (1986), Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993) and Friedlan (1994) use the year-to-yearchangesin a firm’s
accruals as a measure of abnormal accruals. This differenced approach has several disadvantages for IPOs. If
accruals are independent, and identically distributed with constant mean and variance, differencing will induce
a negative serial correlation (of−0.5); see Dechow (1994) and Choi, Gramlich, and Thomas (1993). The latter
report that first differences adequately capture abnormal long-term accruals (e.g. depreciation) but not abnormal
current accruals. Furthermore, the differenced measure can be perverse if earnings management occurs in
periods prior to the test period. The differenced measure is particularly suspect for examining immediate
post-IPO accruals, because the benchmark period (just prior to the IPO) may have been also manipulated.
13. See Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) and Healy (1996).
14. We do not focus explicitly on fraudulent reporting behavior. However, it is possible that firms with high ab-
normal accruals may be found later to have reported fraudulently. We found relatively few cases of subsequent
revelation of fraud in the IPO sample. Of the sample of 159 SEC actions involving alleged financial fraud
from January 1, 1980, to December 31, 1985, which was generously provided by Mike Maher, we found only
three cases associated with IPO firms.
15. For a given yeart , the variables in the Beneish’s M-score, with the Compustat data item numbers in brackets
are:







1− Cost of goods soldt−1[14]
Salest−1[12]
]/[





1− current assetst [4] + PPEt [8]
Total assetst [6]
]/[
1− current assetst−1 + PPEt−1
Total assetst−1
]


















LTDt [93]+ Current liabilitiest [5]
Total assetst [6]
]/[
LTDt−1 + Current liabilitiest−1
Total assetst−1
]
Accruals= (working capital accruals− depreciation[14])/total assets.
See Section 2.1 for the Compustat items to compute working capital accruals. A later model in Beneish
(1997) includes additional variables such as the amount of time listed on the exchange, abnormal returns in
prior periods (usually 12 previous months), dummy variable for number of consecutive quarters with positive
abnormal accruals, and a slightly different variant of the leverage index.
16. Net income is measured as Compustat item 172, the bottom line net income. The results using earnings before
interest and taxes (item 18) are qualitatively similar, and are not reported here. We focus on bottom line net
income because it is the number reported in an earnings announcement in theWall Street Journal, and is more
comprehensive than item 18. Thus, we can capture more fully the effects of discretionary reporting choices,
such as extraordinary items, on the earnings performance. The results are also robust with respect to scaling
by beginning total assets.
17. The median return on assets is 5.47, 3.50, 2.20, 2.00, and 1.62 in years 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. A similar pattern is
observed using means.
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18. We also examine whether the post-issue earnings underperformance is unique to IPO firms or is common also to
non-IPO firms following large abnormal current accruals. Instead of matching by prior earnings performance,
we consider an alternative benchmark based on abnormal current accruals. All firms excluding our test sample
are ranked by their abnormal current accruals in each year. All non-IPO firms with abnormal current accruals
above 0.334 (IPO-firm top abnormal accruals quintile cut-off) belong to the aggressive non-IPO portfolio. (We
did not use quartile cut-offs because the aggressive IPO firm’s abnormal current accruals remain significantly
higher than the matched firm portfolio in the year of the match.) The median of the aggressive non-IPO
portfolio is used as the relative benchmark.
The IPO-aggressive quartile firms’ median abnormal current accruals are lower in years 0, 4, 5, and 6, and
higher in years 1, 2, and 3 when compared with the non-IPO aggressive portfolio medians. The higher abnormal
accruals immediately post-IPO suggests a more persistent incentive to manage earnings for IPO firms than
for non-issuing firms. However, this evidence is weak because only year 1 median difference is statistically
significant at conventional levels.
The median return on sales is statistically lower for the aggressive IPO firms than for the aggressive non-IPO
firms in all years subsequent to the matched year. Thus, it appears that the subsequent decline in performance
is somewhat worse for IPO firms than for non-IPO firms.
19. Correlations using IPO-firm abnormal accruals (not the matched-pair measure) yield similar qualitative results
and so are not reported.
20. Correlations of Beneish M-score with industry-relative earnings levels and changes yield stronger significance;
with levels they are−0.01,−0.11∗∗∗, −0.15∗∗∗, −0.09∗∗∗, −0.13∗∗∗, and−0.11∗∗∗; and with changes they
are−0.12∗∗∗, −0.12∗∗∗, −0.08∗∗, −0.12∗∗∗, and−0.11∗∗∗, respectively. A possible explanation for the
higher significance is that the Beneish M-score captures some normal mean reversion of high earnings which
is removed by the performance-matching procedure.
21. Various windows for return on sales were considered, and the results were qualitatively similar and so are not
reported.
22. We examine whether the negative relation between accruals and subsequent earnings is special to IPO firms
or is also present for non-IPO firms with large accruals. We match IPO firms with non-IPO firms by the size
of IPO-year total accruals. We calculate the matched-relative abnormal accruals and we adjust the earnings
performance measure by subtracting the IPO firm’s return on sales by the accruals-matched firm’s return on
sales. Using rank correlations, these adjusted abnormal accruals continue to predict significantly the earnings
performance in years+1,+2, and+3, and the change in earnings performance between years+1 and+2 and
between+2 and+3.
Note that this procedure yields a rather conservative test for earnings management. In our sample, we find that
the matched firms have even higher abnormal accruals than the IPO firms in the year of the match. If there is
a mechanical reversal effect for abnormal accruals rather than total accruals, the accruals-matched firm will
have greater subsequent reversals and hence lower subsequent earnings than the IPO firm. In addition, the
matched firms may have non-IPO related incentives to also manipulate earnings. Thus, the matched-relative
abnormal accruals measure, here, proxies for incremental earnings management incentives for IPOs beyond
non-IPO earnings management incentives.
23. This raises the question of why firms manage accruals opportunistically when investors correctly discount
for the amount of earnings management. The models of Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) of boosting
short-term cash flows provide useful insights for why this can occur. In these models, firms attempt to improve
short-term cash flows even though investors fully discount for the fact that results are not as good as they
seem. In the context of accruals management, the reasoning is somewhat different. Suppose that investors
do not know what level of accruals is appropriate. Were investors to believe no earnings management would
occur, then there would be an incentive to manage earnings. By increasing accruals, a firm would seem in
the short run to be doing well. Thus, under appropriate assumptions, no earnings management is not a viable
equilibrium. Instead, investors will correctly conjecture the positive average amount of earnings management
that takes place. If the entrepreneur were to make the mistake of failing to inflate earnings, the offering would
be undervalued by investors. Of course, if investors fail to discount rationally for the management of accruals,
this adds a further incentive to inflate earnings at the time of the IPO in order to mislead investors.
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24. Neill, Pourciau, and Schaefer (1995) report that 436 IPOs use liberal accounting methods while only 69
IPOs use conservative methods, in their sample, by defining firms as conservative if they choose accelerated
depreciation and LIFO cost flow assumption; all others are classified as liberal. We compare IPO firms with
similar high-performing matches, and as Beneish (1995) suggests, find they are also likely aggressive reporters.
Thus, our comparisons are more conservative than reported in Neill, Pourciau, and Schaefer.
25. In a previous draft, we also evaluate the relation between abnormal accruals and firm/offering characteristics
representing incentives and opportunities to engage in opportunistic earnings management. We find that
younger firms, more risky issues, and larger issues tend to have greater opportunistic earnings management.
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